



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

but it is his own wife (an admirable an amiable lady) who tells us that “the experience of the thirty years which have elapsed since the foregoing lecture was written, does not seem to justify the author’s sanguine anticipations.” I should like to read you several other extracts here which naively confute the doctrines involved by the wholly innocent but unthinking propos of a disciple who has got by heart only; but I must refrain from want of space. I was prepared also to give some consideration of Mr. Austin’s views of Utility, as well as to discuss, at some length, his ideas of the principles of law; but I must now deny myself in these references also. If any gentleman, however, will consider that a command *as such* is to Mr. Austin the essence of law and morals, as well as in *what* he places this command to give it *meaning, source, reason, and authority*, he will be able to form some conception of what I might finally say of him. Mr. Austin, in short, is one of those finical, over-refined, almost female minds, that, without power in themselves, attach themselves blindly to the guidance of another or others; and his book is a work of infinite external verbal distinction, but it has not a vestige of internal thinking rationale. Heron’s book is, to my mind, a book much more useful to the *student*, though it is very much of a *pêle-mêle*, undigested compilation. Here, too, I have to suppress much.

I have now to conclude these lectures by sincerely thanking you for the very kind and generous attention with which you have assisted me in a very dubious and difficult undertaking.

CONDITIONS OF IMMORTALITY ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE.

By THOS. DAVIDSON.

As a proof of the soul’s immortality it has been frequently urged that all peoples, in all times and under all circumstances, have believed it. Though the allegation is not strictly true, as has been shown by recent researches, it is nevertheless near enough to the truth to form a presumption in favor

of the doctrine specified. It is true that all tribes except the very lowest do believe in immortality of some sort, be it rude and material like the belief of the American Indians and the Ancient Egyptians, or sublimated and shadowy like that of the Buddhists—an immortality which many Buddhist philosophers hold to be equivalent to annihilation. Prevalent as this doctrine of immortality is, the notion connected with it has seldom been defined in the mind of a nation, and more seldom still have the conditions been stated under which immortality would be possible. As a result of this, nearly all the disputes which have arisen on the subject have been grapplings in the dark, neither party to the dispute having any very clear notion what he was disputing for or against. This is especially true at the present day, when the doctrine of immortality is extensively, though quietly, canvassed. Under these circumstances, it may not be uninteresting to attempt, without entering upon the question of human immortality, to discover under what conditions, if any, immortality would be possible, leaving it to others to say whether the human soul possesses these conditions.

Immortality is usually defined as *Eternal Life*. This, according to Aristotle, is incorrect,* on the ground that such a definition includes as a species that which is merely an accident. Immortality is not a form of life or a kind of life: it is something that happens to life—something higher than life, yet something whereof life is a condition. When life passes into immortality, it ceases to be life—it passes beyond life into something higher. All life does not necessarily become immortal, and life, in the ordinary sense, cannot, as such, be immortal. Nevertheless, as we shall see, immortality answers all the conditions of life, although it includes much more. This may seem to be a somewhat wire-drawn distinction, still it means a great deal, and is very essential to an understanding of Aristotle's doctrine of Immortality. Life, as we shall learn, is, in Aristotle's view, essentially a physical process, in its very nature finite, utterly incapable of being eternal. There is, however, no great objection to using the expression *Eternal Life*, provided we bear in mind

* *Topica*, *A*, cap. 5 ad fin. 126 b, 34 sqq. Edit. Bekker.

that, when life passes into the Eternal, when the mortal puts on immortality, it ceases to be life, in the ordinary sense, and mortal. In this way we may speak of the union of eternity and life. Indeed, in certain connections, Aristotle himself uses the word *life* in this sense.

Immortality being defined as life which has passed over into the Eternal, our inquiry resolves itself into three.

- 1°. What are the conditions of life?
- 2°. What are the conditions of eternity?
- 3°. What are the conditions of their union?

First, then,

THE CONDITIONS OF LIFE.

The physical science of the present day, if it does not help us materially in finding out what life is, does throw some light upon the physical conditions of life, i.e. it shows us that life exists under conditions and in forms under which it had not previously been expected to appear.

The tendency of science in recent years has been to prove that in nature there are no gulfs or leaps; that all forces are but forms or manifestations of one force; that the changes in the inorganic world, the upheaval of mountains, and the depression of valleys, &c., proceed gradually and slowly; that between the organic and inorganic worlds there is no clear line of demarcation; that the plant and animal worlds have a common origin and merge into each other; that all animals, man included, instead of being distinct creations, are modifications of one primitive, very simple organization; and, finally, that matter and force, instead of being distinct, are perhaps identical in reality, and certainly correlative in thought. Indeed, it is not hard to see that the so-called development theory, or theory of evolution, will soon be made to account for all the changes in the Universe. These will be held to be mere forms, or stages, or moments, in the all-embracing process of increasing individualization.

This general tendency to abolish distinctions, formerly recognized as absolute, attempts, amongst other things, to blot out the dividing line between the animate or living and the inanimate or lifeless, and to reassert—under another

form, indeed—the position of Aristotle, that the animate can spring from the inanimate.*

Physicists are wont to think that they have explained a thing, when they have shown that it is not essentially different from another thing, even when that other thing is admitted to be inexplicable. So it is in this case. They think they have in some measure explained the animate, by having shown (if, indeed, they have done so) that it is not essentially different from the inanimate, although what that is which causes the inanimate to pass into the animate they do not know. Moreover, they take it for granted that all essential difference between two classes of objects is abolished, when it can be shown that they merge into each other by insensible degrees. There is thus not only no essential distinction between the most cultured and the most savage of men, or between man and the lower animals, but there is none between man and the earth he treads upon. Of course, all such assumptions entirely ignore the active element in change and production, and consider merely the results. But, apart from this, there are many and serious fallacies involved. The mere fact that a thing can be shown to have had its origin in something quite different from itself, something from which it has ascended or descended by insensible gradations, proves nothing with regard to the nature of the thing now. The major premise underlying all such assumption is, that no amount of specific difference can produce a generic difference, which, in Natural Science at least, is admitted to be false. Some logicians, indeed, and notably the Hegelians, claim that logically all existence may be included under one genus, viz. Being; indeed, the whole fabric of the Hegelian logic rests upon this assumption. Aristotle, on the other hand, has most emphatically denied it even for Logic.† However this may be in Logic, in Nature there is no doubt whatsoever. It may be true, for example, that all animals are descended from a common ancestor; that proves nothing with regard to them know. There exist now species

* *De Gen. An.*, cap. xvi. ad init. 721, a, 6.

† *Topica*, 4, cap. 6, 127, a, 26 sqq.; 998, b, 14 sqq.; 1053, b, 20 sqq. Cf. Brentano, *Ueber die mannigfaltigen Bedeut. des Seienden*, p. 6 sqq.

distinct enough to be unfruitful with each other, and, so far as we know, no amount of training will ever bring them nearer to each other. However gradual the differentiation may have been, there must undoubtedly have been a point at which this unfruitfulness began, and, from that moment on, there was a difference of species; in other words, two essentially, or generically different classes of animals. It may be true that man has ascended by insensible gradations from an animal akin to the apes, and that there is but very little distinction between the highest apes and the lowest men; still this proves nothing any more than in the former case. We have a perfect right to say that there was a point at which man separated himself from the lower animals, the point, namely, at which self-consciousness, or reflection upon the process of thinking, began. It may not be easy to put our finger upon the point, or to say of any particular act that it is the outcome of reason as distinguished from instinct; this, however, does not interfere with the matter. Moreover, it is not so true, as some persons would have us believe, that there are no sudden leaps in Nature's processes. Some, indeed many, of the changes on the earth's surface are produced by sudden convulsions, and, in the animal world, we do sometimes find abnormalities of considerable degree, which perpetuate themselves notwithstanding that they have arisen suddenly. From very ancient times, we hear of people having six fingers on each hand and six toes on each foot, and we know that there are, at the present day, whole families having this peculiarity. Facts like these are usually got rid of by being styled freaks of Nature, and looked upon as if they were the result of a caprice for which it is not necessary to account. This may be correct enough in one sense, but why set such an arbitrary limit to Nature's freaks and caprices? If an appendage like a sixth finger, which is of no use, perpetuates itself, how much more is an appendage which is useful, and capable of being developed by use, likely to be permanent? If Nature has a freak to furnish an animal with six fingers instead of five, why may she not have a freak to furnish an animal with reason, or even with an immortal soul? There is a noteworthy point seldom borne in mind in speaking of the gradualness of Nature's processes.

Many of them, though very slow, produce a result which is very sudden. A land-slip, the fall of a house, or the plunge of an iceberg, is a very sudden thing; but it may have taken Nature a hundred or several hundred years to bring it about. Thus, although it could be shown that man has ascended from an ape-like condition, it would not follow either that the change from ape to man was gradual, or even that man is not a freak of Nature. The same will apply generally to all the stages of so-called development. The mere fact that a thing of higher order has sprung from a thing of lower order proves nothing with regard to the similarity of the two. The inorganic is not the organic any more than what is implied by the chemical symbols H₂O is water, however closely related they may be. H₂O is water only when we add electric action, and we may rest assured that the inorganic becomes organic only through the action of that or of some other manifestation of the universal agent. The majority of the popular mistakes into which natural scientists fall arise from a confounding of the essential nature of a thing with its material conditions. As Aristotle says, however, the true nature of a thing is its purpose.

But to return to life and its conditions. Recent researches have shown us that life exists in lower forms than we previously knew, and that the gulf which separates the animate from the inanimate, the organic from the inorganic, as far as material conditions are concerned, is very narrow. Let us see, then, what life is conceived to be by those who have thought most profoundly upon it.

BICHAT, the great French biologist, says life is "the sum of the functions which resist death" (*l'ensemble des fonctions qui résistent à la mort*).

HERBERT SPENCER says it is "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations."

BASTIAN, the author of a most remarkable work, *The Beginnings of Life*, enlarging the latter definition, says life is "the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences."

Passing from the physicists to the great German thinkers, we find that

KANT says: "An organized product of Nature is that in which all is Aim and reciprocally also Means."

HEGEL says, "Life is a means, not for something else, but for the idea of life; it continually produces its infinite form."

After the opinions of the two great thinkers of modern times, we may cite that of the greatest thinker of ancient times:

ARISTOTLE defines life as a "nourishing, growth, and decay, through self." The principle of life is the soul, which is defined to be "the first actuality of a physical body having life in potentiality"; and the philosopher adds, "Whatever is organic is of this nature."

It has taken volumes and would take volumes to convey adequately to the modern mind what Aristotle meant when he used the words *actuality* (*ἐνεργεία*) and *potentiality* (*δύναμις*). There will be occasion to speak of them afterwards.

However different the above definitions may appear at first sight, if we examine them closely and hold them together, we shall see that they are not in any way at variance with each other. On the contrary, we shall find that they mutually supplement each other. If we adopt the very convenient Aristotelian division of *aīt'ā* or grounds, we shall find that the definitions can be distributed among them. These grounds are (1) Matter, (2) Form or Determination, (3) Efficient Cause, and (4) Final Cause.

Bichat's definition attempts to give the matter of life—"The sum of the functions that resist death"; Spencer's and Bastian's give the form—"The continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; Aristotle's gives the efficient cause—"Nourishing, growth, and decay, through self"; Kant's and Hegel's give the final cause—"Life is self-aim." Perhaps, by taking them all together, we might frame an exhaustive definition of life: Life is the sum of those functions which, in a continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations, through self-action, in the processes of nourishment, growth, and decay, resist dissolution for the sake of life. These are the conditions of life, not one of which can be omitted.

Bichat's definition is, logically, a very faulty one. We can never define a thing by saying that it resists its opposite. It

would be very foolish to define motion as the sum of the functions that resist rest, or waking as the sum of the functions that resist sleep; yet these would be as good as the other. Everything resists its opposite. The important part of the definition is, that life is a function or sum of functions. This states its *ὕλη* or matter; in other words, places it in a category—the ninth, namely, in the Aristotelian list, *ποεῖν* or activity. It is important to observe that Aristotle's list of categories does not include actuality and potentiality, which, nevertheless, play a most important part in his philosophy. These, instead of being categories, run alongside all the categories, so that each of the latter may exist in the form of actuality or in that of potentiality. Life, therefore, is an activity either actually or potentially, and is not a quantity or a quality, or any other of the categories. The form of the vital activity is that of an adjustment of internal to external relations. It is, therefore, a *λόγος* or proportion, an activity which is a perpetual ratio, and it is only in this *form* that it is an Actual. A formless, indeterminate activity is really no activity at all; only when the form is added to the potentiality does it become a reality. Though Aristotle enumerates four *αἰτίαι* or grounds, he is quite aware that they are reducible to two—the two enumerated, namely. In that which is eternal, form, efficient cause, and final cause, are all one; only in *φύσις*, in Nature, as it presents itself to the senses, are they sundered. Objects in Nature have four grounds; the Eternal, which lies outside of Nature, has but one. Without going any farther, we might here obtain a formula for the Eternal, by finding out under what circumstances these three grounds become one; but we may reserve this for its proper place. So far, we have not treated of the eternity of life. We have merely found its material and formal grounds. The efficient ground of life is the soul (or *ψυχή*), “the first actuality of a physical body, having life in potentiality.” Soul, with Aristotle, is a word of very wide application. Every organization is endowed with a soul, which is its distinctive essentiality. He says, for example, “If the eye were a distinct organization, vision would be its soul.” The eye which has lost its vision, is no longer an eye in the same sense as before. Soul is the life principle. The final cause of life is

life itself. Aristotle knows this, as we shall see afterwards, as fully as Kant or Hegel.

Summing up these points, we may now reduce our definition of life to a more compact form: *Life is activity, self-supported for its own sake, through adjustment to the external.* Here is the very kernel of the thing. From it you can draw all the phenomena of life, from the lowest even to the highest—from the *monera* of Dr. Hæckel to the most developed of the human race. And you cannot leave out one element of the definition. There is no life which is not an activity; none that is not self-sustained, else we might say that the magnetic needle is alive; none that is not for its own sake, else the planets would be alive; none, finally, that is not an adjustment to the external—for the moment that a living thing ceases to be able to adjust or adapt itself to external circumstances, it perishes. The Darwinian theory of Natural Selection rests upon this part of the definition, as applied to species. A species would, doubtless, be eternal that could adapt itself to all circumstances. This brings us to the second consideration,

THE CONDITIONS OF ETERNITY.

There are two ways in which Eternity may be considered,

- 1°. As endless perpetuity of time;
- 2°. As independence of time.

These however, properly viewed, are really one. A consideration of time and eternity involves a consideration of the two terms already mentioned, viz. *δύναμις* or potentiality, and *ἐνέργεια* or actuality. These are cardinal points in the thought-system of Aristotle. They underlie everything, and that, too, not only in his system, but, though often unobservedly, in many succeeding systems, notably in Christian Theology, in which, for example, the doctrine of the Presence, as has been abundantly shown, is but a transformation of the Aristotelian doctrine of *ἐντελέχεια*, a word nearly synonymous with *ἐνέργεια* or actuality. (Teichmüller, *Aristot. Forschungen*, vol. iii.)

The words *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* stand related to each other as matter and form—form, in this instance, being made to include efficient and final cause.

When we examine the phenomenal world, we see unceasing change, unceasing movement.* When we reflect upon this, our first thought is: Why do not things remain at rest and unchanged? That must be their natural condition. It is some time before we bethink ourselves that rest, being a compound of motions, is harder to explain than mere motion. What, then, is the ground of motion? What does it mean? Aristotle is ready with his answer. Motion, in whatever form it may appear, locomotion, change, &c., is the pathway from potentiality to actuality. The abstract matter of change itself is time. Time, therefore, in Aristotle's view, is not form, but matter or potentiality. Instead of conditioning changes, it is the absolutely conditionable. It becomes real only in change, which is its form. Before, then, we can understand what time, and, consequently, what eternity is, we must know distinctly what is meant by potentiality and actuality.

Pure potentiality, pure matter, as Aristotle asserts, is unknowable. This does not arise from any weakness or imperfection of our minds, as some modern philosophers assert in similar relations, but lies in the very nature of the potential. It is pure negation, in itself neither this nor that, absolutely predicateless and indeterminate. It is, nevertheless, not nothing: it is a form of Being, capable of becoming actual, and thus clearly distinguished from nothing, which can never under any circumstances become actual. Potentiality is the negation of actuality; nothing is the negation of potentiality. That which is not in any form, can never be. *Ex nihilo nihil fit.*

Many of our modern atomists assert that atomic matter and force are inseparable. Though Aristotle is too clear-headed to assume atoms, he nevertheless admits that pure matter has no existence apart from form, which is, of course, only another way of saying that it is unknowable. That which is unknowable has no existence, and *vice versa*. Matter, as far as known, is always united with form, i.e. is something determinate. What, now, is this form? We have seen that form, according to Aristotle, has a wider and a narrower

* Οὐδέτεν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μένετ χρῆμα τὸ εὔπεδον αἰεί. (Simonides.)

Eá là! Thaet on eordhan áuhlt faestlices
veordes on vorulde ne vunath aefre.

(Alfred.)

signification. It is sometimes merely the second of the four grounds of existence, and sometimes it includes the second, third, and fourth. In the latter sense, it is synonymous with *ἐνέργεια* or actuality. There are, however, a large number of stages of actualization, before *ἐντελέχεια*, perfection or complete actualization, is reached. If we consider the material world, in which there are no wholes but only parts, we shall convince ourselves of this. The lowest form of existence or actuality is so-called inanimate matter, conditioned entirely from without. It cannot move or change except as it is moved or changed. It has no endurance whatsoever. It exists only in change, is a perpetual Becoming. Immediately above the material world is the plant-world, with its nutritive soul and power of reproduction within itself. The plant lives by adjusting itself to the external, and dies when it can no longer do this. To preserve itself it reproduces itself in forms wherein it can resist the external better. It thus ekes out its existence by becoming a species, which endures until a condition of things comes round which it cannot overcome.

Question Nature:

“From scarped cliff and quarried stone,
She cries, ‘A thousand types are gone.’ ”

In the plant, as elsewhere, matter is raised to a higher form. It becomes organized—becomes what modern physicists call protoplasm. In the plant, life is self-aim. The plant lives for itself. But there is aim and aim, and a lower aim must give way before a higher. The plant is liable not only to destruction, but to be used for a higher aim. The animal is a higher form of actualization than the plant. Accordingly, the plant's aim must give way before the animal's. Just as the plant presupposes unorganized matter as its *ὕλη* or potentiality, so the animal presupposes the plant with its protoplasm. The animal takes the protoplasm of the plant, and by means of it ascends to a higher actuality. The plant is really only a mass of individuals rather loosely held together by a common aim—so loosely that not only a large number of them can be detached without injury to the plant, but, in many cases, each individual part can be made to develope into a whole plant. Not only, indeed, will twigs become whole trees, but a large number of plants can be propagated from

a single leaf. In the animal, the organization is much higher and more centralized. In some low animal organizations, indeed, parts, when severed, will become wholes; still, these must always be *definite* parts. In higher organizations such a thing is not known. Under no circumstances will the leg of an ox or the arm of a man develope into an ox or a man. In the higher animals, the centralization is complete. But the animal and its species perish, as well as the plant and its species. The animal has, indeed, greater power of adjustment to the external than the plant. Endowed with sensation and power of locomotion, it can seek sustenance over a wide range, and likewise avoid occasions of destruction. Nevertheless, its power of adjustment is limited, and it finally perishes. It reproduces itself, indeed; but in vain. The adjusting power of the species even is limited.

We need not proceed farther in this direction, inasmuch as the meaning of the words "potentiality" and "actuality" are perhaps already, so far, clear. Pure potentiality is absolute negation of existence, though not of being; hence pure potentiality or pure matter has no existence. The lowest form or actuality is unorganized matter, which again is the potentiality or matter of organized matter; and we might go on and show that organized matter is the potentiality of nutrition, nutrition of perception, perception of imagination or conception, conception of understanding, and understanding of reason. The lower actuality is always the potentiality of the next higher, and the process by which the higher stage is reached is movement. Aristotle enumerates four kinds of movement, viz. locomotion, change, growth, and decay. The abstract potentiality of these is time. Without forgetting that a higher actuality may return into a lower—this, indeed, is decay as distinguished from growth—we may say that time is the abstract matter or potentiality of the passage of anything from potentiality to actuality. It will be easy now to state when eternity can be predicated of anything. First, however, we must rid ourselves of one difficulty which has puzzled and yet does puzzle many minds.

It seems to occur naturally to almost every one who begins for the first time to think of eternity, that the eternal must be the unchangeable, that which has absolutely no

potentialities, or rather no possibility of any actuality. It appears as if, by removing change from the Universe, we should remove also the possibility of destruction. This is no doubt true, if only we could remove change. If things could exist in an utterly quiescent state, in a state of entire negation of activity, every one of them would doubtless be independent of time, which, as being the abstract potentiality of change, would have no existence, not even a subjective one. Unfortunately, however, we know of no existence except as in a state of change, a perpetual hovering between potentiality and actuality. The essence of things is this activity, this limiting of themselves as over against other things. This table is known to me only as affecting—that is, as limiting, and determining itself with reference to, my senses. Were this activity to cease, existence itself would cease, and the Universe would be reduced, not to primal matter ($\piρώτη \ \deltaλη$), for that is capable of actuality, but at once to absolute naught. Those, therefore, who look for the Eternal in the Unmoved, in the Unchanging, look for it in the absolute Naught. That, indeed, is independent of time; but it is not eternal, since it is not at all.

Being forbidden, therefore to look for the Eternal in the utterly Inactive and Unchangeable, we are driven to seek it in the Active. There, if anywhere, must be the Eternal. Not in unchangeability, but in some form of changeability, it must lie. We have seen that change—or, to use a more general term, movement—is the pathway between potentiality and actuality; we have found, moreover, that no actuality endures any longer than it can adjust and adapt itself to the External, and that lower actualities, being the conditions of higher ones, the former must give way before the latter. So long, then, as any actuality is unable to adjust itself universally, or so long as there is any actuality higher than it, whereof it is the condition, so long it carries in it the germs of its own destruction. I have spoken as if lack of universal adjustability and subserviency to a higher actuality were two different things. They are not so, however, being only the same thing in somewhat different relations. Lack of universal adjustability is subserviency to the Universe as a whole; subserviency to a higher actuality is lack of adjusta-

bility to a particular part (if I may so speak) of the Universe. This being the case, we may say that the Eternal is the highest actuality, and, *vice versa*, that the highest actuality is the Eternal. Thus, instead of being the negation of actuality, the Eternal is the highest actuality, the purest energy. How, then, can such an energy exist, and what are its conditions?

We have found that that which is incapable of actualization is absolute Nothing. If we were to apply the same reason to the utterly actualized, we should arrive at the same result. If there were anything entirely actualized, so that all its potentialities were actual at the same time, we should arrive at the same state of pure quiescence as in the other case. Thus pure actuality and absolute lack of actuality would be exactly the same thing. In both cases we arrive at the Unchangeable, whereas, as we have seen, the Eternal must be sought in the Changeable. There seems to be a difficulty here. It is one, however, not hard to remove.

Let us take, for example, a portion of unorganized matter, say a piece of coal. We can subject this to any known amount of cold, to some degree of heat, to a considerable amount of pressure, and so forth, and it remains, not, indeed, exactly the same—for, under the influence of cold and heat, it will contract and expand—but such that, when the influence to which it has been subjected is removed, it is the same as it was before. It returns, indeed, of itself to its former state. Let us apply to it, however, a certain amount of heat—let us throw into a flame, for example—and it will undergo a change from which it cannot return to its former condition. It is no longer coal, it is something else. In the same way, water may become ice or steam; but as soon as the influences cease that produce these changes, the ice and the steam again become water. Pass an electric current through your water, however, and it will enter into a state from which it cannot return of itself. It thus appears that both coal and water are capable of adjusting themselves, within a certain limit, to the external; when that limit is reached, they cease to be what they are. Even within those limits, the potentialities of water cannot be all actual at the same time. It cannot at once be water, ice, and steam; nor can it be which of them it wills at any time. In the plant-

world, each individual plant is in a process of unceasing change. Potentialities are becoming actual continually until they are exhausted. Then the plant dies, and though it gives birth to other individuals like it, itself ceases to exist. What is true of the vegetable world, is true with some modifications of the animal world. The animal has a larger number of potentialities, but they are never all at once realized. A lion is never at once old and young, or sleeping and waking. Nevertheless he can be all these without ceasing to be a lion. If, on the contrary, he fall from a precipice and shatter his skull, he actualizes a potentiality whose actualization destroys him,

But what has this to do with the question of eternity? It shows that there are two senses of the word "actual." This Aristotle recognizes in the clearest terms. Indeed we find him, in the definition of the soul, already alluded to, speaking of a *first* actuality, which, of course, implies that he recognized a second or even more. He speaks of the soul as "the first actuality of a physical body having life in potentiality." The difference between a *first* actuality and a *second* is this, that the former is not always real; the latter always. This may be made plainer by an illustration. In the mineral and the plant, neither sleeping nor waking is either potential or actual. In the animal, on the contrary, they are both actual, but not both at once. One is always a *first* actuality and the other a *second*. When the animal is awake, sleep is a *first* actuality, and waking, a *second*. In the same way with knowledge. Almost all knowledge is in a state of *first* actuality; only the small part we are conscious of at any time is in a state of *first* actuality.

The fact that there are two forms or stages of actuality solves the difficulty we encountered by finding that if all the potentialities of a thing were actualized at once, we should arrive at utter quiescence or annihilation, instead of eternity. Let us imagine now, for a moment, that all the potentialities of a thing had reached the form of *first* actuality, with a possibility of reaching the *second* at any time. It is quite plain that, although (say) only one of these could be actual in the *second* form at any given time, they might one and all become actual without the thing's losing its identity or being

annihilated. The passage from first to second actuality might go on forever. Such a thing and only such a thing would be eternal. There is, however, one proviso that must not be forgotten. The thing must be able at will to put anything out of the condition of first into that of second actuality. But this will be better treated elsewhere.

To recapitulate, before passing to our third and last point, the results arrived at concerning the Eternal. The Eternal is that which endures through all time, and is, therefore, independent of it. Time is the abstract potentiality of change. The Eternal is not, therefore, the Changeless, but that which is capable of changing forever without ceasing to be what it is. In order to possess this capability, a thing must have all its potentialities actualized in the form of first actualities, and be capable of turning any of them at will into second actualities. This brings us to

THE CONDITIONS OF THE UNION OF ETERNITY AND LIFE, OR THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH LIFE CAN BECOME ETERNAL.

We defined life to be an activity, self-supported for its own sake, through adjustment to the External. Applying to this the results just arrived at, we obtain the conclusion that life will be eternal only when it has all its potentialities in the form of first actualities, with the capability of raising them to second actualities.

We have found that Aristotle calls the passage from potentiality to actuality, *movement*. The passage from first actuality to second he calls by another name, *energy*. Things that are imperfect, things whose potentialities, not being in the form of first actualities, carry them, when actualized, outside of themselves, have motion, *move*; things that are perfect, whose potentialities are all actualized in such a way that every change is a change, not into something else, but into itself, have energy, *energize*. Thus life, to be eternal, must become an energy. But an energy, from its very signification, is self-supported, exists for its own sake, since it can subserve nothing higher—can be merged in nothing higher—and is, of course, capable of infinite adjustment. It is an *entelecheia* (*ἐντελέχεια*), as Aristotle calls it, having its end in itself.

We thus observe that life, as such, and energy, as such, have three important attributes in common. Why, then, is life, as such, not an energy, and therefore eternal? The answer must be: Because its potentialities are not necessarily all actual; it is therefore liable to pass outside of itself, and so to be destroyed. This brings us to the important result that while all life is not energy, all energy includes life. Though life will not answer all the conditions of energy, energy will answer all the conditions of life. We hence obtain the conclusion that all that is eternal is a higher form of living. We can thus understand why Plato and Aristotle, notably the former, asserted that the Universe was alive. The Universe *is* alive, according to any proper definition of life. Not only so, but the life of the Universe is an energy and therefore eternal. The modern atomist, too, whether rightly or wrongly, claims indestructibility, i.e. eternity, for his atoms and force. In one point, he is certainly right, viz. that atoms, apart from force, i.e. potentiality without energy, are absolutely unthinkable. If atoms are eternal, they must be endowed with energy, and, as we have seen, they must *a fortiori*, be alive. Indeed, among German materialists, it is quite common to speak of matter as immortal. Dr. Büchner entitles the second chapter of his *Force and Matter* "The Immortality of Matter," and the third "The Immortality of Force." However, the whole doctrine of atoms is a mere hypothesis, not only unnecessary, but absolutely self-contradictory and unthinkable. If the maintainers of the hypothesis would only analyze their own thought about atoms, they would soon abandon it. Aristotle was well aware of this, and is never tired of asserting that energy—eternity of activity—implies the absence of matter. Matter, being mere potentiality, cannot, of course, exist in those things in which all potentiality has ceased by passing into actuality; that is, it cannot accompany anything that is eternal. The thought of energy excludes the thought of matter, and, therefore, to assert the eternity of force *and* matter is to assert a contradiction. Matter is a mere abstraction, the abstract potentiality of force.

But to return. Having found that all energy is necessarily life, and that all eternal life is energy, let us see what

we can deduce from the thought of energy. An energy having all its potentialities actualized, must, of course, have them in its own power. If this were not the case, the energy would be affected or determined from without, and, in that case, would have to wait for an external cause to call it into actuality; in other words, it would sink to the level of a mere potentiality. It is necessary to dwell upon this point, inasmuch as upon it rests the whole weight of what is to follow.

We have found that material objects, such as coal and water, can be made to actualize a certain number of their potentialities without being destroyed, and that higher organizations can be made to actualize a very large number with the same result. In no case, however, does any one arrive at a full energy. Not only can coal not be warm and cold at the one time, and not only is water incapable of being ice, water, and steam, at once, but they cannot through themselves be in any one condition. In other words, these can be affected, but cannot energize. Again, the plant and the animal, although possessing in themselves, to a certain extent, the principle of their own development or succession of actualities, nevertheless have no power over these actualities. The plant or animal passes from stage to stage; but it cannot recall any past stage or forestall any future one. The apple-tree cannot produce fruit under a frosty sky, or the lion renew his youth. All the processes in the mineral, vegetable, and animal worlds are movements; not one of them is an energy. An energy in which all is actual must be able to pass to any of its actualities at any moment; in other words, it must be able to energize completely in any of its forms, without depending upon any combination of external circumstances to determine it. But that which is not determined by any external circumstances is free: hence *Pure Energy, the higher life, the true Eternal, is free, absolutely independent, determining itself.* It is, as Aristotle says, pure form—*εἰδος; εἰδὼν*, the form of forms—wherein there is no matter, no potentiality, itself being its own form. Thus Energy, the Eternal, grasps itself. But what is the form of that which grasps itself? Is not that the very form of self-consciousness? And does not self-consciousness answer all the conditions of a pure energy, of an energy which is eter-

nal? Is consciousness not able to pass from form to form at will, to be actual in any of its forms? It would be easy to show that self-consciousness in every point answers the conditions of eternity, and that Aristotle was aware of the fact. But quotations would be as wearisome as useless. The result is beyond all doubt. The Self-conscious, that which thinks itself, is the Immortal.

It would, perhaps, be proper to stop here. Setting out with the common notion of immortality, I have shown its deficiency, substituted a better, and sought to find out under what conditions such immortality would be possible, and have found that it is possible only in the form of free self-consciousness. We have reached the end of our inquiry, having obtained a reply to the question with which we started. We have arrived at a result by no means startling in itself, and yet one which is not usually reached in this way. It is customary to set out with the Conscious, and try to show that it involves the notion of immortality. This is a very difficult procedure, and is consequently almost uniformly unsuccessful. The true method, I believe, is to proceed in the opposite direction, as I have done—to find the conditions of immortality, and then to show that they involve the conditions of consciousness.

Though my task is thus ended, I hope I shall be pardoned if I add a few words to show the value of the result arrived at.

No one who has made the result of the last fifty years' linguistic research his own, is ignorant of the fact, that the land from the shores of the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, westward to the Pacific, is occupied by people of one blood, the so-called Aryan, or Indo-Germanic, or Indo-European race. The same blood flows in the veins of the Hindoo, the Persian, the Russian, the Greek, the Italian, the Kelt, the Teuton, and consequently the American. The gloomy, fantastic Hindoo was brother to the bright, clear-reasoned Greek. It has been often asked, what constituted this immense difference, and scientists and statisticians have been ready with their theories of climate, the influence of plains, and so forth. These have their influence no doubt; but it is much less than is usually supposed—far too little

to account for the immense difference to be explained. The true explanation of the difference lies in the difference between the views of the Universe held by the two peoples—as the Germans would say, in their different *Weltanschauungen*. It is hardly necessary to say that this difference depends mainly upon the light in which the Eternal is regarded. It was not original, but grew up after the separation of the Indo-Germanic race.

Let us consider for a moment some facts connected with the earliest records of the Hindoos and Greeks. Speaking of the former, Max Müller says :

"In the songs of the Rig-veda we find but little of philosophy, but we do occasionally meet with wars of kings, with rivalries of ministers, with triumphs and defeats, with war-songs and imprecations. The active side of life is still prominent in the genuine poetry of the Rishis, and there still exists a certain equilibrium between the two scales of human nature. It is only after the Aryan tribes had advanced southward, and taken quiet possession of the rich plains and beautiful groves of Central India, that they seemed to have turned all their energies and thoughts from the world without them to that more wonderful nature which they perceived within."

In another place, the same author says :

"In the Veda, life after death is not frequently alluded to, and it is more for the goods of this world, for strength, long life, a large family, food, and cattle, that the favor of the gods is implored."

We thus see that the Hindoo, in those ancient times, like the Greek, thought more of life than of immortality. Certain it is that, to both, the future life looked inactive compared with the present. But the Hindoo loved inactivity, while the Greek hated it. The thought expressed in a very ancient commentary to the Veda was, doubtless, very consolatory to the former :

"It is with us, when we enter the divine spirit, as if a lump of salt were thrown into the sea; it becomes dissolved into the water (from which it was produced), and is not to be taken out again. But wherever you take the water and taste it, it is salt. Thus is the great, endless, and boundless Being but one mass of knowledge. As the water becomes salt, and the salt becomes water again, thus has the Divine Spirit appeared from out the elements and disappears again into

them. When we have passed away, there is no longer any name."

Here the love for inactivity has imparted itself very strongly to the conception of immortality. Compare this with the famous words of the Greek Achilleus, which he speaks to Odysseus in the underworld :

"Noble Odysseus, speak not thus of death,
As if thou couldst console me. I would be
A laborer on earth, and serve for hire
Some man of mean estate, who makes scant cheer,
Rather than reign o'er all that have gone down
To death. Speak rather of my noble son,
Whether or not he yet has joined the wars
To fight among the foremost of the host," &c.*

The Hindoo love of inactivity developed, naturally enough, into the Buddhistic doctrine of *Nirvana*, while the Greek hatred of the same and love of activity developed into the Christian doctrine of immortality. Indeed, Buddhism and Christianity are the legitimate outcomes of the two different views of the Eternal. The Hindoo and the Greek equally desired and longed for immortality ; but the one looked for it in utter inactivity, which, as we have seen, would be utter annihilation. This is, indeed, the meaning of the word *Nirvana*. As Max Müller says :

"No person who reads with attention the metaphysical speculations on the *Nirvana*, contained in the Buddhistic canon, can arrive at any other conviction than that expressed by Burnouf, viz.: that Nirvana, the highest aim, the *summum bonum*, of Buddhism, is the absolute nothing."

It is customary among superficial thinkers of the present day to belaud Buddhism at the expense of Christianity, and to speak as if the former were equal, if not superior, to the latter. It is true that there are many wonderful truths and beautiful sayings in the Buddhist books ; but the religion, as a whole, stands infinitely below Christianity. If it could be shown that the Buddhist ethical system were superior in every point to the Christian, that would not alter the result. The speculative error maintained by Buddhism in regard to the Eternal vitiates the whole system beyond recovery. The condition of Eastern Asia to-day may be said to be the result

* Bryant's Translation.

of a failure to find the true Eternal, while the infinite-seeming progress of the Christian nations is due to the fact that, in Christianity, the Aristotelian doctrine, that the Eternal is pure energy or self-consciousness, is acknowledged to the fullest extent. As Hegel says: "The world's history is a progress in the consciousness of freedom."

The Apostle Paul, speaking of Jesus Christ, says he "hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the gospel." It has often been asserted, in opposition to this, that the Greeks, as well as many other nations, believed in the immortality of the soul ages before the appearance of Jesus Christ. In a certain view, this is true, and yet the Apostle's remark is also true in a very striking sense. Though Aristotle had stated the conditions of immortality more than three hundred years before the Christian era, and had come to the conclusion that pure reason, *νοῦς*, being pure energy, was immortal, yet he cannot be said to have brought immortality to light. So far, indeed, was this from being the case, that many of his followers, down even to the present day, have doubted whether he held the doctrine of the individual soul's immortality at all. Admitting that he did even, we are, nevertheless, constrained to assert that Christianity first brought true immortality, or, as the Apostle says, "life and immortality," to light. Brought to light, in this passage, (*φωτισαυτος*,) means *illuminated*. Christianity first illuminated life and immortality. What Aristotle reached speculatively, Christianity reached intuitively and stated at first metaphorically. We hear it called "living water," "bread of life," "flesh and blood"; but again we are told, "It is the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing; the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." What the founder of Christianity reached intuitively and stated metaphorically, later reflection grounded speculatively. This was, of course, done from the resources of the existing philosophy, and chiefly from that of Aristotle. Thus while Christianity was the first system which recognized immortality as a great and important fact, indeed *the great fact*, it was from Aristotle that the doctrines respecting its conditions and nature were drawn. How very Aristotelian, for example, is the expression, "This

corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal immortality"! Immortality does not belong to life: it must be put on. He who puts it on, returns to the image of God. As Aristotle says:

"If God subsists eternally as perfectly as we do sometimes, that is wondrous; and if yet more perfectly, it is yet more wondrous. And even so it is. And life belongs to Him; for the energy of spirit is life, and that energy is He; but His energy is in itself best and eternal life. Hence we call God living, eternal, best; so that life and an æon perpetual, eternal are His; for this is God."

MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM.

By D. J. SNIDER.

Midsummer Night's Dream is perhaps the most popular of Shakspeare's comedies. Its weird ethereal scenery captivates the purely poetical nature, its striking sensuous effects impress the most ordinary mind, while its faint rainbow-like outlines of the profoundest truths entice the thinker with an irresistible charm to explore the hidden meaning of the poet. There is no work of our author that is so universal, that appeals so strongly to high and low, to old and young, to man and woman. Its shadowy forms appear, disappear, and reappear in the wildest sport, and the critic may sometimes doubt his ability to track them through all their mazy hues. Nor can it be denied that there is a capricious play of fancy over and around the underlying elements of the drama. Still, like all of Shakspeare's pieces, it is based on thought, and must look to the same for its justification. Our attempt, therefore, will be to seize and fix these fleeting iridescent shapes in the abstract forms of thought. To be sure, the poetry of the play is thus destroyed; but criticism is not poetry, but prose. For if criticism were poetry, it had better keep silent in the presence of this piece, and not vainly attempt to imitate that which is inimitable, or say over again that which the Poet has already so adequately said. The only justification of the critic, therefore, is that he expresses the content of this drama in a new form—the form of thought